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A growing body of literature has recently discussed the access of migrants to property rights 
over assets as a requirement for the protection of their human rights and basic interests. Little 
attention has been paid, however, to the fact that the right to decide over an individual’s migra-
tion to a given place is itself a property right. This paper aims to close this gap by describing 
international treaties regarding migration as mechanisms to transfer bundles of such property 
rights. This approach embarks to compare the distributional effects of different treaties regard-
ing migration. It also aims to demonstrate that such treaties often do not limit themselves to 
transactions of property rights among States, but are capable of transferring property rights 
from States to individuals. A property rights approach highlights that the exclusion of would-
be immigrants from would-be receiving countries means to impose a (negative) external effect 
on them and their country of origin. A review of different types of treaties demonstrates the 
tendency in all of these treaties to internalise such external effects. The paper thus predicts 
that the prevention of migration will get more expensive as the external effects of this activity 
will have to be internalised to a growing degree.
Keywords: International Migration Governance; International Treaties; Theory of Property 
Rights; Internalisation; Non-standard agreements
I. Introduction
The claim of this paper is that the common characteristic of the growing number1 and the growing variety2 
of international treaties on migration is an exchange of prerogatives or entitlements or rights among con-
tracting parties or with third parties. These can be the prerogatives of States, of International Organisations 
or the rights of individuals. They are exchanged for other prerogatives, entitlements, rights or money. The 
author will summarise these prerogatives, entitlements or rights under the technical term of property rights 
and apply the theory of property rights to describe these forms of cooperation.
Because the author intends to restrict the analysis here on the applicability of property rights theory to 
international treaties, the discussion will be limited to a very brief definition of the term property rights 
and the nature of the property right over migration:3 as such, property rights are defined as the socially 
recognised exclusive control over a good. The property right over migration is defined as the socially (here 
also: legally) recognised exclusive control over the migration of a given person to a given State (see section 
 * Max Planck Institute for the Study of Multireligious and Multiethnic Societies, DE. Contact: schlegel@mmg.mpg.de.
 1 Particularly regarding readmission agreements, see Jean-Pierre Cassarino, ‘Dealing with Unbalanced Reciprocities: Cooperation on 
Readmission and Implications’ (2010) Viewpoints 1–29, 1, 3.
 2 See the graph in Jean-Pierre Cassarino, ‘Informalising Readmission Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood’ (2007) 42(2) The Inter-
national Spectator 179–196, 186. See also Luca Lixi, ‘Beyond Transactional Deals: Building Lasting Migration Partnerships in the 
Mediterranean’ (2017) 3 <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/beyond-transactional-deals-building-lasting-migration-part-
nerships-mediterranean> accessed 19 July 2018.
 3 For an extended discussion, see Stefan Schlegel, Der Entscheid über Migration als Verfügungsrecht: Eine Anwendung der 
 Ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts auf das Migrationsrecht am Beispiel der Schweiz (Studien und Beiträge zum Öffentlichen Recht, 
Mohr Siebeck 2017); Nutshell version: Stefan Schlegel, ‘Is Control over Migration an Asset? And If It Is, Who Can Make the Most 
of It?’ (2017) <https://nccr-onthemove.ch/wp_live14/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Policy-Brief-nccr-on-the-move-06-Stefan-
Schlegel-EN-Web.pdf> accessed 19 July 2018.s
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2 for a more extensive definition). Analysing treaties regarding migration as a transaction of such property 
rights (or some partial bundle of them) will prove helpful – on a conceptual level – to address the following 
research questions:
 - From which agent to another is value transferred by treaties regarding migration?
 - Who is the beneficiary, and to what extent do they benefit through these treaties, and who obtains 
the possibility to impose external effects on others?
 ◦ What, in particular, is the role that individuals play in these treaties as the recipients of assets or 
as the agents whose opportunities in life are diminished?
 - The emphasis on the observation that these treaties transfer property rights will draw attention to 
the question of the costs and the rules of such transactions.
 - The observation that property rights over migration are bundles of rights, will highlight the possibil-
ity to restructure the bundles of rights of each involved party. This entails the question of how those 
bundles might be restructured to the potential benefit of all the parties involved.
The paper draws almost exclusively on examples of international treaties that bind either countries in 
Europe amongst each other or a European country to a third country or the European Union (hereinafter 
referred to as “EU”) to a third country. The author will, however, limit the scope of the question to the agree-
ments within the EU. The EU is considered only in cases in which it is the party to international treaties with 
third countries. Such treaties are governed by international law rather than EU law.
The economic methodology that shapes the reasoning of what follows is often associated with a function-
alist and reductionist understanding, which is geared to obtain efficiency. It is not, however, incompatible 
with a pluralistic approach. This is so because the methodology does not entail a presupposition of the 
preferences of the involved agents. These might be disordered or even contradictory and the maximisa-
tion of these preferences can be considered very different from what colloquially is under the concept of 
efficiency.4 If inserted into a political process, these conflicting preferences might, therefore, very well end 
result up in complex, multi-layered and conflicting objectives as they are reflected in migration law and in 
treaties regarding migration.5 It is then with respect to these objectives that the effects of migration govern-
ance are perceived as negative or positive external effects and with respect to these objectives that States are 
expected to enter into treaties in order to internalise these effects.
The paper is organised into four sections. The first sets out the property rights approach to immigration 
law. It gives a short overview of the use of the concept of property rights in the migration literature and 
specifies in what respect the approach that will be taken in this article differs. The second section embeds 
the approach in the literature on property rights theory in international law and applies it to treaties 
regarding the governance of migration. The third section exemplifies what bundles of property rights 
are transferred in the most important types of treaties regarding migration. The final section lays out the 
benefits of a property rights approach for the analysis of international treaties on migration. It highlights 
the ability of this approach to map the internalisation of externalities that is obtained by the transaction 
of property rights.
II. The Theory of Property Rights
The term property right is defined as the socially recognised exclusive control over a good.6 The notion 
of “good” is broad. Whatever is valued by agents for its utility, is a good within the meaning of this 
 4 This broader concept of rationality that does not presuppose certain specific preferences is sometimes called ‘thin rationality’: 
Tomer Broude, ‘Behavioral International Law’ (2015) 163 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1099–1157, 1108. However, this 
concept of rationality calls into question, what should be maximised, not the rationality of the decision making as such. It, how-
ever, still leaves open the possibility that States show patterns of irrational behaviour under specific circumstances.
 5 There is limited but expanding literature on behavioural international law that seeks to improve the understanding of States (and 
other international actors) before the background of empirical knowledge about “bounded rationality” and biases in decision mak-
ing: ibid. 1118. Anne van Aaken and Tomer Broude, ‘Behavioral Economic Analysis of International Law’ in Eugene Kontorovich 
and Francesco Parisi (eds), Economic Analysis of International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016); Anne van Aaken, ‘Behavioral 
Economic Analysis of International Law’ (2014) 55(2) Harvard International Law Journal 421–481. Tomer Broude thinks that States 
might well be less rational than individuals because their decisions are made both by agents and collectives: Broude (n 4) 1122.
 6 Rupert Windisch and Peter Burgold, ‘Verfügungsrechte’ in Riccardo Mosena and Eggert Winter (eds), Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon; 
 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (The Addison-Wesley series in economics, Pearson/Addison Wesley 2014) 
77; Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts (Springer Berlin Heidelberg; Imprint: 
Springer 2012) 69; Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Aspen Publishers 2011) 39; Rudolf Richter and Eirik G Furubotn, 
Neue Institutionenökonomik: Eine Einführung und kritische Würdigung (Mohr Siebeck 2010) 90–91; Michael B Mascia and C. A Claus, 
‘A Property Rights Approach to Understanding Human Displacement from Protected Areas: the Case of Marine Protected Areas’ 
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definition.7 Whatever agents are willing to invest time and/or effort and money in, in order to keep 
it or to obtain it, qualifies as a good. The term is by no means restricted to the control over physical 
goods or the legal institute of property.8 Mere aspects of larger goods, such as the right to use a good 
for a given time or to use it in some specific way, can also be valuable and, therefore, qualify as a good.9 
Every exclusively controlled aspect of a good – tiny or temporary as this control may be – qualifies as 
a property right under this definition. “Socially recognised” encompasses the exclusive control over 
a good that is legally recognised (not merely protected by social convention) and backed by the legal 
order.
Both, the prerogatives of States or International Organisations as well as the entitlements and rights of 
individuals – either towards other individuals or towards a State – fulfil this definition. They have some value 
to those who own them and they can be defended via a legal mechanism. They can, therefore, be subsumed 
under the common heading of property rights.
The theory of property rights is an approach, developed in the larger field of New Institutional Economics, 
to analyse human interaction. It states that human interaction, the distribution of goods among individuals 
and the nature of the redistribution of goods through the market, and through State activity, is best under-
stood if analysed as the distribution of rights – exclusively to use goods or aspects of goods and as the trans-
action of these rights.10 As Harold Demsetz put it for market transactions: ‘When a transaction is concluded 
in the marketplace, two bundles of property rights are exchanged. A bundle of rights often attaches to a physical 
commodity or a service but it is the value of the right that determines the value of what is exchanged ’.11 Nothing, 
in principle, prevents us to extend this insight to the analysis of transactions within hierarchically organised 
systems like firms or States (as opposed to horizontal transactions among stakeholders on the market) or 
between subjects of international law12 (in a sort of international marketplace).13
A. External Effects
Closely related to the concept of property rights is the concept of external effects. External effects are the 
uncompensated effects of the actions of one agent vis-à-vis others. The distribution of property rights in a 
society determines who can impose an external effect on whom. An understanding of how external effects 
are distributed in a society thus presupposes an understanding of how property rights are distributed. Exter-
nal effects can be positive as well as negative and they can be pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary, from 
individuals to individuals, from States to States or from States to individuals or vice versa.
External effects play out in reciprocal relationships. Either the external effect that A can impose on B is 
bigger than the one that B can impose on A or vice versa. The property right of a farmer to keep the ranger’s 
(2008) 23(1) Conservation Biology 16–23, 17; Louis De Alessi, ‘The Economics of Property Rights: A Review of the Evidence’ (1980) 
2 Research in Law and Economics 1–47, 4; Armen A Alchian and Harold Demsetz, ‘The Property Right Paradigm’ (1973) 33(1) The 
Journal of Economic History 16–27, 17; Eirik G Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, ‘Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey 
of Recent Literature’ (1972) 10(4) Journal of Economic Literature 1137–1162, 1140; Harold Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property 
Rights’ (1967) 57(2) The American Economic Review 347–359, 347; Ronald H Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 The 
Journal of Law and Economics 1–44, 44.
 7 Schäfer and Ott (n 6) 69.
 8 ibid. 589.
 9 Furubotn and Pejovich (n 6) 1140.
 10 Richter and Furubotn (n 6) 91.
 11 Demsetz (n 6) 347. See also Furubotn and Pejovich (n 6) 1139.
 12 Stephan Hobe and Otto Kimminich, Einführung in das Völkerrecht (Francke 2014) 12; Joel P Trachtman, The International Law of 
Economic Migration: Toward the Fourth Freedom (W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 2009) 271; Jeffrey Dunoff and 
Joel Trachtman, ‘Economic Analysis of International Law’ (1999) 24(1) The Yale Journal of International Law 1–59, 11. Trachtman 
suggests to treat international Organisations like the WTO and supranational Organisations like the EU as the equivalent of a firm 
in the international context and ad-hoc treaties as the equivalent of market transactions: Joel P Trachtman, The Economic Structure 
of International Law (Harvard University Press 2008) 53.
 13 ibid. 10. A school of thought rooted in legal realism warns against an overstatement of the analogy of treaties and contracts because 
there exists no international government to enforce treaty law and the difficulties to monetize the stakes in the interactions 
between subjects of international law, which is why treaties might be better analysed as a sort of letter of intent: Jack L Goldsmith 
and Eric A Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 90; Francesco Parisi and Daniel Pi, ‘The Economic 
Analysis of International Treaty Law’ in Eugene Kontorovich and Francesco Parisi (eds), Economic Analysis of International Law 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2016) 104. Given that this paper distinguishes between international treaties and informal agreements, 
and given that a series of treaties analysed in this paper dispose of established mechanisms of enforcement, the assumption that 
international treaties bear more similarities to actually enforceable contracts than to mere statements of intend is more plausible 
as a starting point than the contrary assumption. However, the fact that the enforcement of treaties is frequently precarious is 
important to keep in mind in the analysis of treaties regarding migration and State’s incentives to conclude such treaties. For an 
explicit treatment of international treaties as a form of contract, see Posner (n 7) 174; Alan O Sykes, ‘International Law’ in A. M 
Polinsky and Steven Shavell (eds), Handbook of Law and Economics (North-Holland 2007) 771.
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cattle off his fields imposes an external effect on the ranger just as (in an alternative allocation of property 
rights) the right of the ranger to let his cattle roam free imposes an external effect on the farmer. Likewise, 
the right of State A to exclude citizens from State B imposes an external effect on these citizens just as the 
right of the citizens of State B to immigrate to State A imposes an external effect on A and its citizens.14 From 
a wealth-maximisation point of view, the interesting question is how to avoid the more serious of the two 
external effects.15
One of the functions of the transaction of property rights is to internalise external effects to a greater 
degree.16 The possibility of negotiations and transactions is the driver of this process of internalisation. If 
property rights are allocated in a way that will create important external effects, the concerned agents will 
try to negotiate in order to internalize them to a greater degree.17 This is true for transactions among pri-
vates on the marketplace, as well as transactions among States or from States to individuals in international 
negotiations.18
B. The Property Right Over Migration
The property right on which this paper focuses is the right, exclusively to control the access of a given indi-
vidual to a given State.19 The control over this access – which embodies the possibility to prevent access – is 
a good of considerable value.20 It is usually termed a prerogative when it is in the hands of the State, and a 
right when it is in the hands of the individual. In the theory of property rights, it is a property right in either 
case. It can be transacted between the two by an administrative decision, by a legal reform or – as is the focus 
of this paper – by a treaty.
From a proprety rights’ perspective, immigration law can, therefore, be described as the sum of rules that 
allocate property rights to control access to a given State. Immigration law also has to define the rules by 
which these property rights can be transferred from one agent to another and how they are enforced. This 
description also applies to international migration law that regulates these questions among States, some-
times with the involvement of International Organisations.
C. Migration and Property Rights in the Literature
The way to apply the theory of property rights on the realm of immigration law as described above is admit-
tedly uncommon. The literature that creates links between migration and property rights is scant and the 
literature that applies the theory of property rights to the control over an individual’s migration to a given 
place as the relevant property right in a systematic manner is practically inexistent.21 Roughly, the literature 
at the overlap between migration studies and the theory of property rights can be subdivided into three 
main fields:
 - A literature in migration studies that researches the nexus between the allocation and protection 
of property rights over commodities such as land and housing in the country of origin or tran-
sit and the migration patterns of the relevant population.22 This literature finds its equivalent in 
 14 See for the example of the effect imposed on Tunisia by Italy: Lixi (n 2) 9.
 15 Coase (n 6) 2.
 16 Demsetz (n 6) 348.
 17 ibid 348. For the context of international law, see Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law (n 12) 28, 33.
 18 Eric A Posner and A. O Sykes, Economic Foundations of International Law (Harvard University Press 2012) 63; Sykes (n 13) 768, 
 Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press 2005) 88.
 19 For the importance that the right to access has for the use and administration of all common pool resources, see Edella Schlager 
and Elinor Ostrom, ‘Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis’ (1992) 68(3) Land Economics 249, 
250.
 20 See for the US-Context Alessandra Casella and Adam B. Cox, ‘A Property Rights Approach to Temporary Work Visas’ (2018) 47(1) 
The Journal of Legal Studies 195–227.
 21 See the extended overview over the literature in Schlegel, Der Entscheid über Migration als Verfügungsrecht (n 3), 80–88.
 22 See for instance Michele Valsecchi, ‘Land property rights and international migration: Evidence from Mexico’ (2014) 110 Journal 
of Development Economics 276–290, 289, who finds that improved protection of property rights over land in Mexico mitigated 
the fear of losing land titles while abroad and therefore contributed to enhanced emigration; Eugenia Chernina, Paul Castañeda 
Dower and Andrei Markevich, ‘Property rights, land liquidity, and internal migration’ (2014) 110 Journal of Development Econom-
ics 191–215 demonstrate in a historical case study of pre-revolutionary Russia that the enhanced transferability of property rights 
in land stimulated internal migration; Carol McAusland and Peter Kuhn, ‘Bidding for brains: Intellectual property rights and the 
international migration of knowledge workers’ (2011) 95(1) Journal of Development Economics 77–87 model the relationship of 
the degree of property rights protection over intellectual property in different countries and the incentives to migrate that differ-
ences in this protection creates for knowledge workers.
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 immigration law in the discussion which property rights over movable and immovable things have 
to be granted to given groups of migrants in accordance with national law or international trea-
ties like the Refugee Convention (that regulates access to movable and immovable property in its 
Art. 13).23 The property right over migration (as opposed to property rights over physical assets) 
plays no role in this literature.
 - A body of literature in political theory, discussing the validity of the analogy of property rights over 
houses or clubs and the right to exclude foreigners from countries. Christopher Wellman, who ar-
gues for a right to restrict migration on the basis of an analogy of States and Clubs, uses the term, 
albeit only for the rights of private owners of land, not for the right of association as a separate 
property right, and not for the property right over the migration of a given person that could be 
allocated to that person or to the State.24 A subset within this literature that makes intensive use of 
the concept of property rights concerns the debate on open borders within the libertarian camp.25 
Note however, that this debate restricts itself to the question of what rights to invite migrants to 
a certain place are included in the bundle of rights of the owner of privately owned land. All the 
rights of access to institutions (such as political systems and markets that may thrive under these 
institutional roofs) are – in this view – ultimately derivatives of property rights to land. The decision 
over the access to either the territory or to institutions – or the decisions over both, bundled in one 
single decision – is not, however, treated as a property right that is transferable between a State and 
an individual.
 - A literature in law, specifically in law and economics that analogises implicitly26 (rarely explicitly)27 
the property right over migration (or a partial bundle of rights thereof or citizenship) to other prop-
erty rights over goods that are handed out by the State (such as licences or franchises). Most explicit-
ly, this is done by Eleanor Brown who describes visas (to the US) as a form of “new property”,28 in the 
sense of Charles Reich’s seminal article.29 A recent example also refers to visas to the US as property 
rights, and characterises them as bundles of right, and brings into play the possibility of unbundling 
those bundles and applying different transaction rules at different times in order to obtain certain 
policy goals.30 It also implies that the admission of migrants creates external effects on the labour 
market that have to be taken into account.31 An important contributor to this literature is Ayelet 
Shachar. She describes citizenship (the fullest possible bundle of rights regarding migration in my 
terms) as an entitlement composed of a bundle of rights.32 This implies that the non- allocation of 
 23 See Ezekiel Simperingham and Scott Leckie, ‘Article 13’ in Andreas Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford commentaries on international law. Oxford University Press 2010) 884–89; 
James C Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (CUP 2005) 517–27.
 24 Christopher H Wellman, ‘Immigration and Freedom of Association’ (2008) 119(1) Ethics 109–141, 130–137. For a short summary of 
the libertarian argument for open borders in order to protect the property rights (in land etc.) of the citizens of a receiving country, 
see Bryan Caplan, ‘Why Should we Restrict Immigration?’ (2012) 32(1) Cato Journal 5–24, 17–18.
 25 For an overview over this specific debate, see Walter Block and Gene Callahan, ‘Is there a Right to Immigration? A Libertarian Per-
spective’ (2003) Human Rights Review.
 26 See for instance the policy proposition of Anu Bradford, ‘Sharing the Risks and Rewards of Economic Migration’ (2013) 80 The 
University of Chicago Law Review 29–56, aiming to distribute potential gains of migration between countries of origin, countries 
of destination and migrants. See also Adam B Cox and Eric A Posner, ‘The Second Order Structure of Immigration Law’ (2007) 59(4) 
Stanford Law Review 809–856, 827, introducing the problem of information asymmetry into the regulation of irregular migration.
 27 See Adam B Cox and Eric A Posner, ‘The Rights of Migrants: An Optimal Contract Framework’ (2009) 84(1) New York University Law 
Review 1403–1463, 1417. The authors use the term “bundle of rights”, which States might transfer to migrants and they mention 
that this comes at a cost for the State. The idea of the transaction of a property right is not applied explicitly, however.
 28 Eleanor M L Brown, ‘Visa as Property, Visa as Collateral’ (2011) 64(4) Vanderbilt Law Review 1047–1105, 1048.
 29 Charles A Reich, ‘The New Property’ (1964) 73(5) The Yale Law Journal 733–787.
 30 Casella and Cox (n 20) 2. I differ from the account of property rights given in this paper however in that I treat the property right 
over migration as an individualised property right, one that determines the right of one specific person to access one specific coun-
try and therefore describes the relationship of a specific individual and a individual State from the start. In the account of Casella 
and Cox it becomes personalised only upon allocation: ibid 15. What is described here as the personalisation of the property right 
is described in my approach as the transaction of a property right from a State to an individual.
 31 ibid 27.
 32 Ayelet Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality (Harvard University Press 2009) 5, 44. Note that the idea 
of a transaction of the good citizenship is used differently in that approach than it is used here. Ayelet Shachar’s concern is the 
transaction of the good citizenship from one generation to the next, not the transaction of a bundle of rights concerning the migra-
tion of one specific individual to a specific State. Ayelet Shachar however mentions the possibility of a reallocation of membership 
rights; ibid 71. For an extension of Ayelet Shachar’s approach on residency permissions in European countries, see Oliviero Angeli 
and Holger Kolb, ‘Nicht nur effizienter, sondern auch gerechter? Ein Modell preisbasierter Zuwanderungssteuerung’ (2011) 31 
Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik 254–259, 254–56.
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citizenship of a well-developed country to people of the Global South has an impoverishing effect 
on them (and hence a negative external effect), an effect that Ayelet Shachar suggests to partly 
internalise with a citizenship levy.33 This approach has later been taken up in development econom-
ics. The wealth enhancing effect of this bundle of rights has been termed the “citizenship rent” or 
a “citizenship premium”.34 A particularly rich contribution to the theory of property rights in the 
context of migration draws from literature on the property rights over natural resources,35 and 
analyses displacement in its relationship to property rights over natural resources.36 Remarkable is 
the unbundling of property rights over natural resources thus obtained. The bundle is subdivided 
in a right to access and a right to exclusion from certain geographical areas. Both these aspects of 
property rights play the central role in immigration law. The fundamental question it has to answer 
is who has access to and who can exclude from a certain State.
While the approach of this article builds on the third of these bodies of literatures, it adds three 
important aspects.
Firstly, the insight – based on the work of Ronald Coase37 – that property rights are not naturally allocated 
to their current holder, but may be reallocated through negotiations or by regulatory intervention. In the 
context of the property right over migration, the decision of its initial allocation is largely focused on the 
question of whether to allocate it to the State or to the individual in question.38 This insight entails the 
observation that external effects are different if different agents own the property right.39 This is why the 
transaction of the property right can lower or enhance overall external effects.
Secondly, it systematically analyses the transferability of the property right over migration. It does so 
in drawing on the insight that the definition of the rule of transaction is just as important as the  initial 
allocation of the property right and in systematically enquiring, under what condition and at what 
moment the property right is transacted between a State and an individual (or any two other agents 
involved in the transaction, like third States or International Organisations) and what transaction rule 
applies to the transaction.40
Thirdly – this is the focus of this paper – the insight that property rights over migration can be allocated 
to alternative stakeholders is extended to the analysis of treaties. I analyse them as international trans-
actions of property rights. An overview of how this fits into the literature on the economic analysis of 
international law is given in section III. This step applies Coase’s key insight to the relationship among 
States and International Organisations: hierarchical intervention (State intervention in the domestic con-
text; supra-State-level intervention in the international context) is not the only way to deal with external 
effects. They can be internalised through the negotiated exchange of property rights if transaction costs are 
not prohibitively high. No “WTO for migration”41 is strictly necessary to deal with the social costs that are 
caused by the way that States regulate migration, provided that transaction costs for negotiations among 
States are not prohibitively high.
It is argued that there is a number of reasons to make the translation of migration law into the tech-
nical language of property rights theory worthwhile. The most important one is that it can describe the 
prerogative of a State and the right of an individual as the same entity and, therefore, the relationship of a 
(potential) migrant and a (potential) receiving State as the concurring attempt to control the same good, the 
control over which can be transacted between the two. The reciprocity of this relationship is fundamental to 
understanding the reciprocity of its external effects. Whoever owns the control over an idividual’s migration 
to a given place can impose an external effect on the other agent(s).42 The value of the property right for 
 33 Shachar (n 32) 96–108.
 34 Branko Milanović, Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 
2016) 5, 132.
 35 In particular on the framework developed in Schlager and Ostrom (n 20).
 36 Mascia and Claus (n 6).
 37 Coase (n 6).
 38 The insight of Coase has been applied to the property right over migration but only for its trade among employers, not for its pos-
sible transaction between a State and an individual. Casella and Cox (n 20) 21.
 39 Coase (n 6) 2.
 40 This builds on the three rules identified in Guido Calabresi and Douglas A Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85(6) Harvard Law Review 1089–1128.
 41 Timothy J Hatton, ‘Should we Have a WTO for International Migration?’ (2007) 22(50) Economic Policy 339–383.
 42 See Schlager and Ostrom (n 19) 250.
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each side can then be assessed not only as the value of its immediate utility for the current holder, but also 
in relation to the value of the external effect it allows to impose.43
In the specific context of international law, the emphasis on the possibility of the transaction of these 
property rights improves our understanding of when and by which mechanism the role of an individual is 
enhanced and fostered in international law.
The next section, therefore, extends the property rights approach to the international realm.
III. International Migration Law as an Exchange of Property Rights
International lawyers, even the few that apply law and economics to the analysis of international law,44 are 
reluctant to rely on the terminology of property rights to describe what is allocated and transferred among 
States. However, the fact that the term property right is unfamiliar to describe the control over goods that 
are commonly allocated and transacted by international law is not in itself a good reason to forego the 
potential insights of the theory of property rights. The theory is often applied implicitly and occasionally 
explicitly.45 Property rights in international law encompass all rights to control goods backed by either a 
treaty or by customary law.46
It is a property rights approach to claim: ‘Politics is not the study of the distribution of goods, as is commonly 
suggested, but the study of the distribution of authority in society, including but not limited to authority over 
goods’.47 Rights, exclusively to control certain goods in a society, are a form of authority. The allocation of 
property rights is, therefore, the allocation of authority. One form of authority is the right to decide over the 
migration of a given person to a given place. Another form of authority is the capability to allocate these 
property rights, in other words the capacity to set rules regarding migration. Given that this is a good itself, 
the control over it is a property right as well.48
A transaction of property rights to International or Supranational Organisations occurs whenever an 
International or a Supranational Organisation obtains the competence to set rules and, thereby, the preroga-
tive to restructure, on a general and abstract level, the bundles of rights of migrants, would-be migrants, and 
of its member states. There are three basic types of property rights regarding migration that can be trans-
acted to International Organisations: The property right to set rules regarding migration (e.g. the EU obtains 
the prerogative to set the cornerstones of a common asylum policy [Art. 78 TFEU] and a common immigra-
tion policy [Art. 79 TFEU]); the property right to apply rules via a judicial body (e.g. the Council of Europe 
obtains the prerogative for its Court to apply the ECHR on migration cases, thereby allocating the property 
 43 See Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law (n 12) 41.
 44 See the fundamental contributions of Eugene Kontorovich and Francesco Parisi (eds), Economic Analysis of International Law 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2016); Posner and Sykes (n 18); Sykes (n 13); Dunoff and Trachtman (n 12); Trachtman, The Economic 
Structure of International Law (n 12); Dunoff and Trachtman (n 12). For pioneering contributions to behavioral economics of inter-
national law, see van Aaken and Broude (n 5); Broude (n 4); van Aaken (n 5).
 45 Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law (n 12) 23, 15; John A C Conybeare, ‘International Organisation and the 
Theory of Property Rights’ (1980) 34(03) International Organisation 307–334; Keohane (n 18) 89.
 46 The law and economics literature is sceptical regarding the legal character of customary international law. For an overview over 
the debate, see Sykes (n 13) 763–66; Keohane (n 18) 88. However, given that property rights, as defined above, can emerge from 
any social practice, not just from law in the strict sense, a custom among States that imposes some price on the State that violates 
such custom (and be it only reputational damage), qualifies as a system of property rights in the sense that it allocates certain 
prerogatives to States (like the prerogative to send migrants with an irregular status to their country of origin) and it is enforceable 
at least to the degree that infringement comes at a reputational price. See Eugene Kontorovich and Francesco Parisi, ‘Introduction’ 
in Eugene Kontorovich and Francesco Parisi (eds), Economic Analysis of International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016) 1.
 47 Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law (n 12) 27. Abraham Bell, ‘Economic Analysis of Territorial Sovereignity’ in 
Eugene Kontorovich and Francesco Parisi (eds), Economic Analysis of International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016) rejects the 
idea to “copy directly” property rights analysis for the understanding of territorial sovereignty and subsequently the analysis of 
international relations among States. He draws attention to the features that makes States very special agents (like the fact that 
they are not supposed to maximize their own utility but that of their citizens and the fact that there is no central power to enforce 
property rights among States). His own analysis of trans-boundary resources uses a lot of tools of property right theory, however, to 
the degree that he relies on property right theory in all but the name. It is undeniable that the relationship among States deals with 
very uncommon property rights and that they can only be described when taking into account the property rights of individuals 
towards the State. The broad definition of property rights he uses (“the ability to derive utility or consume value from an asset”) 
(at 93) fits for all the aspects of State sovereignty. All aspects of state sovereignty amount to the ability to derive utility from an 
asset, be it a tangible, physical asset or a prerogative to act in a certain way from which utility might flow for the State. For another 
example for the implicit use of property rights theory, see Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Ineraction Between Domestic an International Law’ 
in Eugene Kontorovich and Francesco Parisi (eds), Economic Analysis of International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016) 207.
 48 Dunoff and Trachtman (n 12) 14. See also Ryan Pevnick, Immigration and the Constraints of Justice: Between Open Borders and Abso-
lute Sovereignty (Cambridge University Press 2011) 37. In the terminology of Schlager and Ostrom it is the right to management. 
See Schlager and Ostrom (n 19) 251.
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right over migration in individual cases), or the property right to regulate migration to a given territory, like 
a State. The transaction of property rights to an International Organisation requires, in other words, that it 
obtains the prerogative to decide what was previously its Member State’s prerogative (or potential migrant’s 
right) to decide. Soft power and the capacity of agenda setting do not constitute for the transaction of prop-
erty rights over migration to International Organisations.49
A. Treaties Regarding Migration as Enabler of Transactions
The allocation of property rights and the transaction thereof is – according to the approach developed here 
– the main object of international cooperation:50 ‘The assets traded in this international ‘market’ are not goods 
or services per se, but assets peculiar to States: components of power or jurisdiction’.51
This is useful to understand what is traded in international treaties regarding migration: (States’) preroga-
tives to control, govern and/or prevent certain forms of immigration or emigration.52 ‘When States cooperate, 
they agree not to exercise authority that they had ex-ante, they agree to accept the exercise of authority by other 
States that the other State lacked ex-ante, or they agree to pool authority in an International Organisation’.53 
The quote captures part of the problem we are facing when trying to specify what kind of property rights are 
exchanged when States agree to cooperate on the issue of migration. Quite often it is the right to “exercise 
authority” or in other words the “allocation of authority”,54 in this case, it is the allocation of authority over 
migration that is traded. As Joel Trachtman‘s quote suggests, this authority can be transferred from one State 
to another (if the other State newly acquires the prerogative to decide, what initially was the first State’s pre-
rogative to decide) or pooled in an International Organisation in the above defined sense. What the quote 
does not hint to, however, is that this prerogative can also be transferred to individuals. In cases where no 
State or International Organisation obtains the prerogative which the contracting States are giving up, the 
prerogative does not evaporate. The good, the control over a given activity, still has to be somewhere. It is 
distributed among individuals. An example may clarify this point: when two or more States enter into an 
agreement on the free movement of persons, they do not trade the authority over immigration to their terri-
tory to another State. It is not State A that obtains the right to control how many citizens of State A migrate 
to State B (nor is it the international or supranational organisation that might administer the agreement on 
free movement). They transfer it to the citizens of the contracting State instead. Now every citizen of State B 
owns the right to control whether he or she will migrate to State A. A State prerogative has been dispersed 
among the citizens of a contracting State. It is now their individual right.
The mechanism of this metamorphosis is the transaction of a large number of property rights – each 
regarding the control over the international mobility of one individual to one State – from that State to 
those individuals. It becomes clear that the property right over migration fundamentally has the nature of a 
veto. It consists first and foremost in the right to veto a person’s mobility to a given State. If I obtain the right 
to veto my mobility to a given place, if no one but myself can legally veto my migration, it can also be said 
that I have a right to migrate. It follows that whenever individuals can migrate to another State without the 
possibility of this being vetoed, they have obtained the property right over their own migration to a given 
place.
Whether treaties provide for the transaction of the right to set rules or for the allocation of property 
rights according to these rules, whether they provide for transactions among States or from States to 
 individuals (or to IOs), the common characteristics of all these treaties is a transaction of property rights. 
It follows that the theory of property rights allows us to systematise and to compare the vectors and the 
values of the rights that are being exchanged.
 49 In section IV, where different types of treaties are analysed regarding their transactional capacity, further examples for transactions 
to International Organisations are presented.
 50 The idea of a transaction – broadly understood – makes up the core of the analogy between a marketplace and the economic 
analysis of international law: Dunoff and Trachtman (n 12) 12. For a description of international relations that starts with the 
Coase-Theorem as the central explanation for State cooperation and the internalization of externalities emerging in international 
relations, see Keohane (n 18) 85.
 51 Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law (n 12) 10. See also Hobe and Kimminich (n 12) 12; James Hollifield, ‘Migra-
tion and the Global Mobility of Labor: A Public Goods Approach’ in Rey Koslowski (ed), Global Mobility Regimes (Palgrave Macmillan 
2011) 234; Sykes (n 13) 762; Dunoff and Trachtman (n 12) 13. For the component of State power to rely on force in international 
relations, described as a property right, see Conybeare (n 45) 326, 333.
 52 Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law (n 12) 119. For the possibility to trade the prerogative to trigger refugee 
movements, see Conybeare (n 45) 321.
 53 Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law (n 12) X. See also Posner and Sykes (n 18) 24.
 54 ibid.
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A first step to in doing this is to unbundle the property rights that are typically transferred in treaties 
 regarding migration. The rights in question can be specified and differentiated in several dimensions: in 
terms of time, space, or access to markets and so on. This unbundling allows us to specify what kind of 
former State prerogatives are actually traded. Since these are only partial aspects of States’ former compe-
tencies, they are just a part of a once fuller bundle of rights. What is exchanged are actually property rights 
of – or property rights over – specific actions of specific groups of people. These rights can contain the veto 
over somebody’s migration to a given place, or much less than that (e.g. just a visa liberalisation) or much 
more than that (e.g. access to family reunification and social transfers). The traded property rights concern 
an undetermined number of people or – less frequently – a determined number of people.
Regardless of whether it is an undetermined or a determined number of property rights that is traded, it 
is not just a specific bundle of rights that is transferred (as might be the case in an individual administrative 
or court decision or a contract among privates) but rather a bundle of bundles of rights.
B. The Dimensions of the Bundles of Rights
This subsection tries to grasp the nature of the bundles (themselves composed of bundles) that are 
exchanged in treaties regarding migration. To do so, the metaphor of a wire rope is helpful. A wire rope 
consists of delicate filaments that are strung together five or ten a piece into a stronger wire. This one then 
is strung with more of the same strength to a larger bundle and these bundles again with others until a wire 
rope is formed.
The specific aspects of the migratory situation of a given (potential) migrant and one specific State can be 
thought of as the filament that composes the tiniest wire in the rope. The relationship of an individual and 
a (foreign) State can be described as the relationship of two bundles of rights. We can imagine them as two 
wire ropes. Their thickness depends on the number of rights a (potential) migrant has towards a State or 
how much discretion a (potential) receiving State has over a (potential) migrant. The strength of both wire 
ropes can be altered if a filament or a bundle of filaments is taken out of one of the two and strung together 
with the other. Alternatively, filaments of every single wire rope can be taken out and strung together to a 
new wire rope. The first constellation is the case when entire bundles of rights of a given group of people are 
transferred, for instance in a treaty that gives a general right to migration to a restricted group of people (e.g. 
diplomats or highly qualified service provider), the latter is the case when a small aspect of the previously 
State-owned bundle is transferred to a large group of people, for instance in a visa liberalisation scheme. 
Since treaties create either of these effects by tying together bundles regarding an unspecified number of 
potential migrants or specific filaments out of these bundles, it is helpful to think of the substance of what 
is exchanged as bundles of bundles.
The filaments in individual bundles can be described as different dimensions of the good “control over 
migration”. Two obvious dimensions are the temporal and geographical dimensions.55 The bundle of rights 
of an individual regarding its international mobility can vary in the time-span for which it grants access to 
a given country. The same is true for the geographical dimension. The access that is granted can be to just a 
region, the whole country or a group of countries.
A dimension very important for the understanding of the social impact of migration is the market-access-
dimension. It determines the markets within a geographical area to which a migrant gets access – whether it 
is the entire labour market or only certain of its branches or only certain levels of qualifications or only under 
certain circumstances (like the condition that no resident could be found to fill a vacancy) and whether the 
market for services is also accessible.
A further important dimension could be labelled the fiscal dimension. It determines the forms of contri-
butions that migrants must make to the receiving countries and the social transfers they have access to in 
turn. This dimension is closely related to what could be called the consolidation dimension. It determines 
to what degree migrants have options to prolong and consolidate their permission to stay in a country, 
whether they have access to a more permanent and more secure status and whether they eventually have 
access to citizenship. The question of access to family reunification can also be included in this dimension.
Finally, a procedural dimension defines what procedural rights (potential) migrants have, either in cases 
where they claim that they have a certain “filament” in their bundle of rights (e.g. their right to bring their 
family or their right to get permanent residency), or in cases in which they oppose the attenuation of their 
 55 An instructive example of a geographically restricted bundle of rights concerning migration would be a working visa that restricts 
access to the Greater London Area, as it was suggested to create after Brexit: Dave Hill, ‘The Case for a more Independent, post-
Brexit London is gaining Strength’ The Guardian (11 July 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/davehillblog/2016/
jul/11/the-case-for-a-more-independent-post-brexit-london-is-gaining-strength> accessed 16 July 2018.
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bundle of rights by the State. This procedural dimension can be thought of as a kind of auxiliary aspect of a 
bundle of rights that can help to protect other sticks in the bundle. Its practical importance for the protec-
tion of other sticks within the bundle can be illustrated by the fact that some treaties regarding migration 
contain explicit procedural guarantees. As an example, the treaty between the EU and Switzerland on the 
free movement of persons56 guarantees the right to file complaints with the relevant authority and to an 
appeal at a national court (Art. 11 III).
IV. A Description of Treaties on Migration in Property Rights Terms
The aim of this section is to represent different types of treaties regarding migration and to demonstrate 
that the transaction of property rights over migration is their common characteristic.
The organising principle of this section is neither the geographical scope of treaties nor the chronological 
order in which treaties evolved, but the nature of the bundles of rights that they transfer. What the author 
hopes to demonstrate is that the vast spectrum of types of treaties has one thing in common – that they 
transfer property rights over migration. The chosen treaties are not case studies therefore, but representa-
tives of types of treaties that do transfer specific property rights or transfer them in a specific way. The dis-
cussion will begin with the types of treaties that transfer bundles of rights of States or of the citizens of the 
contracting States, then move on to types of treaties that transfer property rights to individuals on the basis 
of criteria other than their citizenship and then move on to types of treaties that transfer only very specific 
“filaments” or “sticks” of the much larger bundle of rights.
A. Friendship- and Equal Treatment Treaties
Friendship- and equal treatment treaties sprang up in large numbers in the second half of the 19th century 
and came in different forms.57
They mostly transfer property rights to States and hardly ever to individuals. Potential receiving countries 
transfer property rights that were formally their sovereign prerogatives to potential sending countries. They 
did not become individual rights of migrating citizens of the contracting parties. Migrants have the opportu-
nity to oppose a violation of these treaties solely through the diplomatic protection exercised by the country 
of origin.58
B. Free Movement of Persons
Comparatively late to be introduced, but easy to describe in terms of property rights are schemes regard-
ing the free movement of persons. Here, the bundle exchanged is the property right to control whether 
or not a specific migration of a given individual to a given place can happen or not. While the receiving 
States beforehand owned that property right, they hand it over by entering the treaty (or by the end of a 
transitional period). The individual bundle of rights that is transferred to citizens of the contracting States 
might vary but the bundle that the beneficiaries obtain is typically fairly robust and gives access not only 
to the territory of a country but also to its markets, to permanent residency, family reunification and some 
welfare benefits.
These treaties do not – first and foremost – transfer bundles of rights to a Contracting State, but rather 
to its citizens. It is a sort of a third party beneficiary contract. The States involved are not the primary ben-
eficiaries of the treaty in the sense that it is not their bundle of rights that is thickened by the transfer. The 
veto over the potential immigration of their citizens to a contracting State has not been transferred to the 
countries of origin but rather to its citizens. These citizens thereby obtained the right to immigrate into a 
contracting State. In the most paradigmatic cases of this sort of treaties, the agreements that link the coun-
tries of the EEA (with the exception of Liechtenstein) and Switzerland to the free movement of persons’ area 
of the EU, the contracting States do not only gain – for their citizens – the same rights as they transfer to 
the citizens of EU countries, they also gain (partial) access to the common market for goods and services. 
 56 Accord entre la Confédération suisse, d’une part, et la Communauté européenne et ses Etats membres, d’autre part, sur la libre 
circulation des personnes 21 June 1999.
 57 Walter A. Stoffel, Die völkervertraglichen Gleichbehandlungsverpflichtungen der Schweiz gegenüber den Ausländern: Eine Untersu-
chung über die Bedeutung der Gleichbehandlungsklauseln in den Niederlassungsverträgen (Schweizer Studien zum internationalen 
Recht vol 17, Schulthess 1979) 63, 68–72.
 58 Jürgen Bast, Aufenthaltsrecht und Migrationssteuerung (Mohr Siebeck 2011) 85; Niraj Nathwani, ‘The Purpose of Asylum’ (2000) 
12(3) International Journal of Refugee Law 354–379, 359. Stoffel, in 1979, was of the view that diplomatic protection was still at 
the time the more effective way to enforce the legal position of a foreigner than International Human Rights protection.
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Potential migrants, therefore, are not the only beneficiaries of these treaties. The treaties are also a precondi-
tion for the access to markets of goods and services.
While the association of Switzerland to the system of free movement is static and does not evolve auto-
matically, Norway and Island, as members of the EEA (again, exceptions apply for Liechtenstein) have to take 
over the evolving EU-law on the matter.59 The transaction of property rights over migration is embedded in 
a transfer of legislative prerogatives to the Union. It is an example in which treaties transfer property rights 
to set rules to a supra-State Organisation.
C. Treaties Concerning the Protection of Refugees
According to the above definition of property rights, Human Rights are property rights that are allocated 
to the  concerned individuals in the sense that they grant these individuals exclusive control over certain 
spheres of their life, such as their private life, their religious beliefs, their political views and so on, this 
control is generally valued and, therefore, qualify as goods. These goods are not granted or allocated for 
economic reasons, nor are they suitable for transactions in the marketplace. Nevertheless, they are goods, 
the rights to control them needs to be allocated, there are alternatives to their current allocation (they could 
be allocated to States for instance) and there are transactions of these rights or of aspects of them.60 Human 
Rights are, therefore, not excluded from a fruitful analysis through a property rights’ lens. If that holds true, 
it also applies to the right to seek asylum (or at least the a right to not be sent back) for refugees, the group 
of among migrants whose Human Rights are threatened in a particular way by the prosecution through they 
endure in their country of origin.
The bundle of rights that is transferred by the Refugee Convention does not contain a right to legally 
migrate. Under the Refugee Convention, ‘(…) migrants must already have moved in order to become eligible 
for the right to move’.61 But for refugees lawfully staying in a Member State, it includes a bundle of rights that 
is granted independently of other individuals’ rights, like the protection against refoulement,62 freedom of 
internal movement and access to self-employment.63 Other rights are defined in relation to the threshold of 
the rights of citizens (or citizens of the most favoured nation),64 such as access to labour.65 People acquire the 
bundle of rights in question not because of their relationship with a Member State but because they qualify 
as refugees. The bundle of rights they acquire (in principle from each of the signatory States they manage to 
reach66 theoretically, they can choose in which of these states them to claim this bundle) has considerable 
value. People get instantly wealthier (in the sense of the substantiveness of their bundle of rights) when 
they cross the thin red line from just being an involuntary migrant to being a refugee. Note that this holds 
true even when merely the non-refoulement provision of the Convention is respected and is independent of 
whether receiving countries grant refugees a legal status or socio-economic rights. In that case, the bundle 
of rights of refugees is attenuated – and arguably wrongfully attenuated67 – but still bolder than the one of 
involuntary migrants without the guarantee of non-refoulement as it is set out in Art. 33 I of the Convention. 
Refugees, in this case, are still distinguished by the right to remain, which has still considerable value.
The example of the Refugee Convention points to a central distinction in treaties concerning migration: 
those who benefit individuals with regard to their relation to a signatory State (most commonly as its citi-
zens) and those who benefit people in relation to their personal characteristics other than the characteristic 
of their citizenship.
With its Art. 35 and 36 and Art. II and III of the Protocol of 1967, both of which oblige the State parties to 
cooperate with the UNHCR and to provide it with the information necessary for the exercise of its function, 
 59 Stephen Booth, ‘Britain’s EU immigration debate: Norway and Switzerland are not the Answer’ (2014) <https://openeurope.org.
uk/intelligence/immigration-and-justice/norway-and-switzerland/> accessed 18 April 2018.
 60 Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law (n 12) 16.
 61 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, ‘Moving Beyond the Refugee Law Paradigm’ (2017) 111(1) American Journal of International Law 8–12, 9.
 62 This refers to the non-refoulement as guaranteed by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 28 July 1951, Art. 33 I. It 
only applies to refugees in the sense of the Convention. Hathaway (n 23) 304.
 63 ibid. 657.
 64 ibid. 155.
 65 Which means a full access to the labour market in countries that grant free movement of persons to citizens of some other coun-
tries: Alice Edwards, ‘Article 17–19 1951 Convention’ in Andreas Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (OUP 2010), n. 40 on art. 17.
 66 Anna Lübbe, ‘Migrationspartnerschaften: Verweisung auf Transitstaaten ohne Rücksicht auf die Familieneinheit?’ (2017) 37(1) 
Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik 15–21, 17.
 67 For arguments that point to the conclusion that the Convention ultimately demands to grant a legal status to refugees, see Hatha-
way (n 23) 658–59.
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the Convention may also serve as an example of a treaty by which States transfer some prerogatives to an 
International Organisation, albeit not property rights over migration in the above defined sense. These pre-
rogatives are rather rudimentary nature when compared to the supervisory mechanism of Human Rights 
Treaties.68
D. Human Rights Treaties
Human Rights treaties are an example of treaties that only partially concern migration and only partially 
transfer bundles of rights concerning migration.
Four aspects of bundles of rights in the context of migration are typically transferred from signatory States 
to individuals by Human Rights treaties: a right – under specific circumstances – to enter a country and to 
stay there in cases of family reunification, protected by a Right to Family Life. A right to remain in a country 
in cases where removal would amount to cruel or inhuman treatment or a breach of a Right to Family Life 
or Private Life, protection against discrimination and procedural rights.
By ratifying Human Rights treaties, States agree to transfer substantial bundles of rights to individuals 
who fulfil specific conditions. If in some cases, fulfilling specific conditions leads to a claim to enter a coun-
try or to remain there, it also transfers property rights over migration to (potential) migrants. By ratifying 
a Human Rights treaty that is equipped with some sort of enforcement mechanism (most prominently the 
European Court of Human Rights), States also agree to forgo some authority over subsequent transactions 
that might be triggered by an expansive jurisprudence of this enforcement mechanism.69 In Joel Trachtman’s 
terminology, this prerogative to extend an individual right’s protection by way of an evolving jurisprudence 
is the transfer of former State prerogatives (and thereby of property rights) to an International Organisation.
Note, however, that the existence of an enforcement mechanism properly speaking, albeit important for 
the practical value of the property right, is not decisive for the question of whether the property right itself 
has been transferred or not. The right is also transferred by conventions whose mechanism of enforcement 
is rudimentary or non-binding, as long as the substantive rights guaranteed by the treaty in question are 
indeed rights (and not mere declarations of intent). The practical difference between property rights that 
are merely granted and property rights that are backed by an enforcement mechanism illustrates the impor-
tance of the procedural dimension within a bundle of rights, a dimension that is attenuated in the case of 
treaties without a proper mechanism of enforcement.
E. Readmission Agreements
Readmission agreements are markedly different from the previous examples since they do not create any 
new right to migrate or any new obligation to restrict or undo migration (by the country of origin). Readmis-
sion agreements (as long as they do not concern the readmission of third-country nationals) solely insist that 
States have an obligation to take back citizens that reside abroad unlawfully.70
The key to understanding readmission agreements from a property rights perspective is the insight that 
migration has some value, even if it is unlawful.71 To use an analogy with property rights over land: squatting 
illegally on land owned by someone else has some immediate utility albeit even if only a fraction of the util-
ity it would have for the same person if she could build on that land and be protected by law against interfer-
ences. Likewise, irregular migration has some utility to those who engage in it but only a fraction of what it 
could have as compared to if migration that is was protected by the law. Legally, it is the country of destina-
tion that still has the veto over the concerned individual’s migration to this State. But establishing the actual 
distribution of property rights as they are allocated by immigration law proves to be unpractical because 
it is too expensive (enforcement costs are prohibitively high). In cases in which irregular migrants are not 
deported, despite the fact that their irregular status prevails, it is the irregular migrants themselves that hold 
a factual veto over their deportation because it proves to be prohibitively expensive – either for practical or 
for political reasons – to deport them. When the costs of deportation would be lower than the utility that 
a State sees in re-establishing the legal allocation of property rights over migration, it would deport those 
irregular migrants. As long as costs are prohibitively high, the factual veto remains and irregular migrants 
can stay until they decide to leave. The enforcement of land rights against squatters can be difficult and 
 68 Marjoleine Zieck, ‘Art. 35–36 Convention and Art. II–III Protocol 1967’ in Andreas Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (OUP 2010) 1508. (n. 91 on Art. 35).
 69 Nathwani (n 58) 360.
 70 Kay Hailbronner, ‘Readmission Agreements and the Obligation on States under Public International Law to Readmit their Own and 
Foreign Nationals’ (1997) 57 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1–49, 7.
 71 Cassarino (n 1) 6.
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expensive in an environment of weak property rights  protection and rapid urban growth. Likewise, it can 
be expensive and difficult to enforce immigration law against irregular migrants. The high transaction costs 
(enforcement costs in this case) have in part to do with the difficult cooperation with countries of origin or 
transit.
In stipulating rules, procedures, and documents etc. for the identification, documentation and read-
mission of migrants, readmission agreements are supposed to lower transaction costs – not for a lawful 
transaction of property rights but for a re-establishment of the enforcement of the actual allocation of 
property rights over migration.72
However, this enforcement of the lawful allocation comes at a cost for those who benefit from the irregu-
lar use of this property right. These are first and foremost the irregular migrants themselves who legally have 
no means to migrate. To a degree, it is also their countries of origin who might have an – albeit unarticulated 
– interest in irregular emigration. It might reduce unemployment and poverty at home and it might create 
some remittances,73 even if they remain just a tiny fraction of the remittances that could be generated with 
the option of legal migration available.74 This might be one of the reasons why many countries of origin are 
reluctant to enter these kinds of agreements75 or to honour them. The re-establishment of the legal alloca-
tion of property rights over migration is simply not in their best interest.76 In addition, decision-makers in 
these countries might have understood the crucial role they play in the immigration policy of countries of 
destination for migrants and they might want to capitalise on their strategic position.77
A newer and more inclusive form of agreements with respect to avoiding and undoing irregular migration 
tries to overcome these shortfalls by offering countries of origin an incentive to enter and honour treaties 
that lower the transaction costs of readmission.
F. Non-standard Agreements Linked to Readmission
Under the loose heading of non-standard agreements, I assemble the various different forms of agreements 
that deal with readmission but not exclusively so. The variety of these agreements – they differ not only 
in content but also in their form and formality – has increased as have their number.78 Since 2002, the EU 
systematically links trade and cooperation agreements to the condition of readmission clauses.79 Their com-
mon feature is that they link readmission or other measures against irregular migration to some other issue, 
be it in the larger context of migration governance or outside of it.80 The extension of the scope of a given 
agreement is a technique to create a common basis of interests.81 Issues within the greater context that are 
typically linked to readmission are visa liberalisation schemes.82 An  example in which a mere visa facilitation 
 72 Sergio Carrera, Implementation of EU Readmission Agreements: Identity Determination Dilemmas and the Blurring of Rights (Springer 
Briefs in Law, Springer 2016) 63.
 73 Trachtman, The International Law of Economic Migration (n 12) 54–57.
 74 Cassarino, ‘Informalising Readmission Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood’ (n 2) 182.
 75 Sergio Carrera and others, EU-Morocco Cooperation on Readmission, Borders and Protection: A model to follow? (CEPS paper in 
liberty and security in Europe no. 87, Centre for European Policy Studies 2016) 2; Carrera (n 72) 45–46; Natasja Reslow, ‘EU 
“Mobility” Partnerships: An Initial Assessment of Implementation Dynamics’ (2015) 3(2) Politics and Governance 117, 122; 
Cassarino (n 1) 6; Martin Schieffer, ‘Community Readmission Agreements with Third Countries–Objectives, Substance and Cur-
rent State of Negotiations’ (2003) 5(3) European Journal of Migration and Law 343–357, 343. For the example of a readmission 
agreement (that also encompassed the readmission of third country nationals) between Senegal and Switzerland which was 
not even submitted to the Senegalese Parliament for ratification due to intense internal hostility towards the treaty, see Antje 
Ellermann, ‘The Limits of Unilateral Migration Control: Deportation and Inter-state Cooperation’ (2008) 43(2) Government & 
Opposition 168–189, 168.
 76 For the example of the interests of Morocco towards Spain, see Lixi (n 2) 5. One of the reasons why countries of origin or transit 
are reluctant to enter into such agreements is the risk they pose for the relationship with neighbouring countries, whose citizens 
might as well be negatively affected, especially if it encompasses the readmission of third country nationals: Carrera and others 
(n 75) 6.
 77 Cassarino (n 1) 16.
 78 ibid. 11, 28.
 79 Sandra Lavenex, ‘Multilevelling EU External Governance: The Role of International Organisations in the Diffusion of EU Migration 
Policies’ (2016) 42(4) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 554–570, 561.
 80 Cassarino, ‘Informalising Readmission Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood’ (n 2) 185.
 81 Lixi (n 2) 4; Marion Panizzon, ‘Readmission Agreements of EU Member States: A Case for Subsidiarity or Dualism?’ (2012) 31(4) 
Refugee Survey Quaterly 101–133, 121; Jennifer Gordon, ‘People are not Bananas: How Immigration Differs from Trade’ (2010) 
104(3) Northwestern Universtiy Law Review 1109–1145, 1139; Trachtman, The International Law of Economic Migration (n 12) 
284; Sykes (n 13) 769; Hollifield (n 51) 235; Alexander Betts, ‘The Refugee Regime and Issue-Linkage’ in Rey Koslowski (ed), Global 
Mobility Regimes (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 75.
 82 The concept of linking refugee-burden-sharing with a travel regime has its roots in the 80s, ibid. 86.
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helped to convince the weaker of the two parties, is the  partnership for  mobility between Cape Verde and the 
EU.83 From the perspective of the EU as one party in readmission agreements however, concessions on visa 
issues are only rarely an option, especially when dealing with countries with which readmission agreements 
are most interesting to conclude – source countries of irregular migration.84
In rarer cases, these partnerships offer some possibility for legal labour migration. Examples are the agree-
ments of France and Spain with African countries that list professions for which there is a shortage of 
domestic labour and for which temporary permissions can be issued to citizens of partner States.85 Issues 
outside of the context of migration are things like investment- or development agreements.86
In the laguage of property rights, these agreements are characterised by the fact that they – unlike tradi-
tional readmission agreements – actually do transfer some property rights. They either transfer an entitle-
ment to some payment or engagement by the receiving country to the country of origin or they transfer 
rights to potential migrants who fulfil certain conditions. But they do so merely in exchange for the reduc-
tion of the transaction costs of the reestablishment of the initial legal allocation of the property right over 
migration. States trade some of their authority in one field to regain part of their authority in another field 
– the field of irregular migration.87
G. Visa Agreements
The description of visa agreements in property rights terms relies heavily on the idea of a bundle of rights. 
The filaments that are traded in visa agreements are just a comparatively tiny aspect of the much larger 
bundle that might usefully be described as the bundle that contains the property right over an individual’s 
migration. One rather tiny aspect of the bundle of rights over migration is the possibility to travel to a coun-
try without having to obtain a confirmation that the conditions of entry are fulfilled beforehand. It is just 
this tiny aspect of the bundle that is traded in visa agreements. But given the difficulty to get a visa to an 
OECD-country for many citizens of poorer countries, and given the relatively high value that the possibility 
of business- and tourist trips and family visits have for many people, merely the ability to enter a country 
without previous visa formalities and to remain there for a visit that usually must not exceed some months, 
is of considerable value.88 The importance of the offer of visa liberalisation in the non-standard-agreements 
described above corroborates this.89
H. Dublin Associations
Dublin associations, treaties which link the four EFTA member States to the Dublin-System,90 are very 
different in the form of property rights transferred by them. The most important aspect of what States 
exchange is their former prerogative (hence a property right) to refuse – under certain conditions – to 
readmit noncitizens. The most important of these conditions is that a third country national has entered 
the Schengen-area irregularly via their border (Art. 13 I). In the absence of a treaty, there is no obligation 
to readmit such a person. It is mainly this property right, the right of refusal, that is traded away (to the 
State that can now send asylum seekers back) by associating to the Dublin system. There are others of 
course. For example, the right not to admit people who have family members in the contracting State 
(in the sense of Art. 9 and 10) or to whom the contracting State issued a residence document or visa 
(Art. 12). In exchange, member States acquired the right to send back asylum seekers to other member 
States that fulfil the same conditions (Art. 3 I). They acquire the former right to block readmission from 
other States.
 83 José Pina-Delgado, ‘The Current Scheme to Manage Migration between Europe and Cape Verde: Promoter of Development or Tool 
for Border Closure?’ (2013) 19 Population, Space and Place 404–414, 406.
 84 Schieffer (n 75) 356.
 85 Marion Panizzon, ‘Bilateral Labour Agreements and the GATS: Sharing Responsibility for Managing of Migration and MFN Trade 
Reciprocity’ (2010) Compas Working Paper No 77 14–16. For the agreement between Spain and Morocco, see Lixi (n 2) 8.
 86 Schieffer (n 75) 356.
 87 For an early warning regarding the risks of such an issue-linkage for the capacity to control migration, see Hailbronner (n 70) 46.
 88 For example, the value of visa facilitation by the Schengen area to Cape Verde, See Pina-Delgado (n 83) 407.
 89 Matthias Czaika, Hein de Haas and María Villares-Varela, ‘The Global Evolution of Travel Visa Regimes: An Analysis Based on the 
DEMIG VISA Database’ (2017) International Migration Institute Working Paper Series 11.
 90 Astrid Epiney and Andrea Egbuna-Joss, ‘Schengen Border Codes Regulation (EC) No 562/2006’ in Kay Hailbronner and Daniel 
Thym (eds), EU Immigration and Asylum Law: A Commentary (2 edn, C.H. Beck; Hart 2016) 60. The EU Commission has plans to 
negotiate migration partnerships with more third countries, particularly countries of transit, with the goal to allocate the respon-
sibility to treat asylum claims to these countries. See Lübbe (n 66) 15.
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I. Free Trade Agreements With Mode IV Provisions
Migration issues do not typically stand in the centre of free trade agreements. Some of them, especially 
regional ones, grant some access to the labour market.91 But many agreements, including the GATS, exclude 
the regulation of labour market access explicitly from their scope.92 If they concern human mobility at all, 
it is typically restricted to service providers. However, the very moment a free trade agreement guarantees 
access to a contracting State for service providers in a way that it becomes impossible for the State to exclude 
such a service provider (e.g. on the grounds that quotas are exhausted), a bundle of bundles of property 
rights is traded. It might be a tiny bundle since the conditions for a guaranteed access to a country are nor-
mally quite high for service providers.93 It is still a transfer of a previously sovereign prerogative from a State 
to individual service providers.
In sum, this overview shows that the different forms of treaties concerning fully or partly the international 
governance of migration can be described – all of them except treaties that are strictly concerned with the 
readmission of nationals irregularly staying in another State – as a set of rules for the transaction of bundles 
of property rights. The bundles within the bundle vary greatly, some are rather substantive – like in the case 
of the free movement of persons – and some are very thin – like in the case of visa liberalisation. For some, 
enabling or preventing migration is the actual goal of the transaction, for some, this transaction has an aux-
iliary function like for the protection of Human Rights or to enable trade in services.
V. Transaction of Property Rights over Migration as Internalisation
The property rights approach to treaties concerning migration not only allows to better compare those trea-
ties and their distributional effects. It also enables us to clarify a concept that is far less understood in inter-
national migration law than it is in other fields of international cooperation: external effects of the activity 
of regulating migration as well as of the activity of migrating.
In international environmental law, for instance, the impacts on one country’s environment by another 
country’s environmental law is more intuitively understood in terms of external effects than is the case with 
the impact of migration law on the life-opportunities of citizens of foreign countries.94
A. The General Coasian Argument Applied in Relations Regarding Migration
It was shown in section 2.1 that whenever an alternative allocation of property rights would create smaller 
over-all external effects than the current allocation, a space of negotiations for mutually beneficial transac-
tions of property rights opens up.
What are external effects in the context of the international regulation of migration? Probably the most 
important external effect linked to property rights over migration, but certainly the one that most readily 
lends itself to an economic analysis, is the effect of that access to markets, or – in the reversed allocation 
of property rights – the restriction of market access. Being able to enter a market and to compete, imposes 
external effects (some of which are usually negative) on those who are already in the market. Potential 
receiving States, being able to lock out individuals from a given market, impose a (negative) external effect 
on those locked out. This specific (and most common) allocation of property rights over migration (that 
entails the right to impose the external effect of market exclusion) is a means of non-fiscal redistribution 
from those who would profit from the possibility to migrate to those who profit from the ability to prevent 
migration.95 Since both groups are typically represented by a State96 that pays a price – politically or fiscally 
– if it is unable to internalise this effect, States are concerned by secondary effects regarding market access 
and will seek to negotiate.
Consider the situation in which State A (or a group of States) finds that the external effect imposed on 
its citizen by State B when excluding them from its attractive labour market97 is greater than what it would 
 91 Julia Nielson, ‘Labor Mobility in Regional Trade Agreements’ in Aaditya Mattoo and Antonia Carzaniga (eds), Moving People to 
Deliver Services (Trade and Development. World Bank and OUP 2003) 93 and 101–106. For an overview, see Charlotte Sieber-Gasser, 
‘Variationen der regionalen Personenfreizügigkeit: Die schrittweise Öffnung des Arbeitsmarktes’ (2013) Jusletter.
 92 For post-NAFTA US FTAs see Demetrios G Papademetriou, ‘The Shifting Expectations of Free Trade and Migration’ (2004) 40 
<http://carnegieendowment.org/pdf/files/nafta_report_chaptertwo.pdf> accessed 23 February 2018.
 93 Nielson (n 91) 97.
 94 See e. g. Dunoff and Trachtman (n 12) 14.
 95 Howard F Chang, ‘The Economics of International Labor Migration and the Case for Global Distributive Justice in Liberal Political 
Theory’ (2008) 41 Cornell International Law Journal 1–25, 11.
 96 Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law (n 12) 9.
 97 For the observation that the restriction of market-access causes an external effect, see ibid. 11.
A Bundle of Bundles of Rights – International Treaties Regarding Migration in the 
Light of the Theory of Property Rights
126
be willing to pay State B to open its labour market. Consider that State B agrees on the price (which can be, 
say, a partial access to State A’s market of goods and services). A treaty can then be established that transfers 
property rights. It is now the citizens of State A that can impose an external effect on State B and its citizens 
by competing with them on the labour market of State B. But this external effect is smaller than the one that 
was previously imposed on the citizens of State A by way of excluding them from the labour market of State 
B. Otherwise, provided that there is no outright coercion, irrational behaviour by one of the State parties 
or critical influence of minority interests in one of the States involved,98 the two countries would not have 
concluded such a treaty. The overall sum of negative external effects is reduced. Part of the external effects 
have been internalised.
While the agents in question in the context of international immigration law are mainly States or supra- 
or International Organisations, the external effects they might want to internalise through negotiations 
and reallocations of property rights are often effects borne first and foremost by individuals for whom the 
involved States might have a responsibility to defend their interests (and the political will to do so).
B. A Trend Towards Internalisation?
Is there a trend towards internalisation in international migration law? Internalisation means that States 
and individuals have to take (at least some of) the external effects their behaviour regarding migration/the 
restriction of migration is causing into account. Internalisation can either be obtained by refraining from 
causing external effects them (or by getting compensation) if they are positive, or it can be obtained by 
refraining from causing external effects (or compensate others) if they are negative.
It seems that the increasing density of treaties regarding migration should contribute to such an internali-
sation.99 Otherwise, States enter treaties against their interests (or just in the interest of a powerful minor-
ity) and would end up suffering more negative external effects or forgoing more of the positive effects.100 
An increased internalisation of external effects is, therefore, what we should be observing as the result of a 
growing density of treaties on the issue.
Treaties on the free movement of persons are the most obvious example of an internalisation of external 
effects of migration governance. The external effect of excluding people from a labour- and service market is 
more or less entirely internalised. Member States have to refrain from causing this external effect. Of course, 
the new situation creates its own external effects. These effects may be imposed on inhabitants of the 
regions that are most affected by immigration and those most affected by emigration. But it is very likely that 
the external effects – at least those among the contracting parties – are smaller than in the status quo ante.
Actual examples of free movement treaties in Europe are achieved by issue-linkage with other treaties on 
market access, etc. which indicates that States had to broaden the scope of the negotiation in order to find a 
common basis of interest.101 The so-called Guillotine-clause in the Free Movement of Persons Treaty between 
Switzerland and the EU102 is an example. It states that not only the treaty on free movement but six other 
treaties will be terminated in the case of withdrawal from the treaty on free movement (Art. 25 IV). The EU 
made it clear to Switzerland (which had no inclination to open up its labour market to EU-citizens and their 
family members) that only if linked to free movement of persons, there will be a common basis of interest 
regarding partial access to the single market.103 The external effects of restricting access to the labour market 
are internalised in the sense that they have to be taken into account by the acting country at least so far as 
it would suffer these costs itself by losing partial access to the single market. If the conceding country would 
 98 Note that it can even be rational for a government to conclude a treaty that does more damage than good to the country overall, if 
those who gain from its conclusion have crucial leverage: Xinyuan Dai, ‘International Institutions and National Policies’ (2007) 85 
<https://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/institutions/papers/dai_T500.pdf> accessed 16 April 2018. See also  Posner 
and Sykes (n 18) 265; Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law (n 12) 148.
 99 Sykes (n 13) 768.
 100 Which is a possibility to keep in mind. The acknowledgment of that possibility, however, does complement rather than replace 
the presumption of a rational behaviour of States: van Aaken and Broude (n 5) 255, 269; van Aaken (n 5) 449. It may also happen 
that it is rational for governments to enter a treaty that is over all not beneficial to the country, if it is beneficial to a well-organised 
interest-group: Dai (n 98) 85.
 101 Eytan Meyers, ‘Multilateral Cooperation in International Labor Migration’ (Center for Comparative Immigration Studies 2002) 13 
<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4zv454f5> accessed 16 April 2018.
 102 Accord entre la Confédération suisse, d’une part, et la Communauté européenne et ses Etats membres, d’autre part, sur la libre 
circulation des personnes (n 56).
 103 See the report of the Swiss Government on the so-called Bilateral I: Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, ‘Botschaft zur Genehmigung 
der sektoriellen Abkommen zwischen der Schweiz und der EG’ (23 June 1999) BBl 1999 6128, 6156 and 6309 <https://www.
admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/1999/6128.pdf> accessed 16 April 2018.
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have valued the possibility to restrict migration higher than the value of market access, it would not have 
entered the treaty. Hence, the treaty led overall to a reduction of external effects.
Treaties on the free movement of persons seem to lead to the outcome that maximises the aggregated 
preferences of individuals. The right to control someone’s migration has in all likeliness generally a greater 
value to the person whose migration is at stake than to any other agent. It is, therefore, likely that the 
property right over their own migration would generally end up in their possession if transactions of the 
property right were permitted and costless.104 Treaties on the free movement of persons simulate this out-
come most accurately. They allocate the property right to those agents who impose – in general – smaller 
external effects on others, than in all the alternative allocations.105 They, therefore, do the most advanced job 
in internalising external effects of migration governance. Again, to minimise external effects does not imply 
that they have been eliminated altogether nor that the new situation does not create new external effects. 
It merely claims that the overall sum of external effects has been reduced.
Treaties concerning the protection of refugees and the protection of Human Rights go much less far in 
internalising the external effects of migration governance. They limit themselves to allocating a property 
right over migration (or at least to remain in a country) to only those individuals who would be expoed to 
prosecution or cruel, degrading or inhuman treatment in case of deportation or where the impossibility 
to migrate would separate individuals permanently from their families. Restricting or undoing migration 
would in these cases thus cause particularly strong negative external effects. At least those are internalised. 
Again, these are effects that are felt by individuals, rather than States.
The most interesting case in point to substantiate the hypothesis that treaties regarding migration tend 
to internalise the external effects of the regulation of migration, are non-standard agreements linked to 
readmission. The point can best be made by starting with standard readmission agreements. These have the 
objective to ensure the possibility to further impose the negative external effects that traditional migration 
governance causes on both migrants and their country of origin. Put differently: they ensure that would-be 
migrants cannot impose the external effects that their migration might impose on receiving societies. This 
is why their basis for a common interest is limited. Negotiation or ratification or implementation frequently 
fails.106 Issue-linkage, the concept of extending the scope of the treaty, allows to sweeten it for the other 
party and, therefore, to broaden the possible basis of interest.107 The linked issue allows the party who 
accepts the implementation of migration restriction to gain something in turn. It is a compensation for an 
external effect it continues to accept. Reciprocity of interests, a characteristic that is often lacking in relations 
regarding migration, as opposed to relations regarding trade,108 is achieved in these cases in that one of the 
two States promises some additional good while the other merely promises to commit what it was obliged 
to do at the outset, but factually could not be forced to do.
From a point of view of State interests, these sorts of agreements will often seem unbalanced with respect 
to the countries of origin.109 But from a point of view of the property rights that are actually transferred, 
these agreements seem to be asymmetrical and operate to the detriment of the potential receiving country. 
This is the case so because receiving countries have to transfer some property rights – meagre as they may 
be – for the simple aim of enforcing the property right over migration as it is legally already allocated to 
them – the right to restrict and undo immigration from the contracting State.
This is not in contradiction with the observation that interests are unbalanced in these agreements. 
Interests are highly unbalanced in the initial allocation of the property rights over migration which was 
established by, and serves the interests of typical receiving countries rather than the interests of migrants or 
typical countries of origin. Since this asymmetry of interests is only superficially addressed by non-standard 
 104 Schlegel, Der Entscheid über Migration als Verfügungsrecht (n 3) 167.
 105 The argument here is twofold. It states first that potential migrants generally value the property right over their own migration to 
a given place higher than anybody else (also than any potential receiving State) because the risk of being stuck in a State with a 
hopeless political and economic environment for them is greater than the risk for a receiving society to be overwhelmed by immi-
gration, and because they alone have the incentives and the information necessary to invest in the value of the property right. In a 
world without transaction costs, they could, therefore, generally obtain this property right. This implies that the negative external 
effects that migrants impose on receiving countries by their immigration are in general smaller than the negative external effects 
that potential receiving countries impose on potential migrants by preventing their immigration. Otherwise, the receiving States 
would be willing to pay a larger sum for the property right over this particular migration (to avoid the external effect imposed by 
it) which is why they would have obtained it in a world without transaction costs.
 106 See the examples given in Section 4.5 and 4.6.
 107 Panizzon, ‘Readmission Agreements of EU Member States: A Case for Subsidiarity or Dualism?’ (n 81) 121; Hatton (n 41) 368.
 108 Gordon (n 81) 1133; Hatton (n 41) 366; Meyers (n 101) 8.
 109 Lixi (n 2) 4; Cassarino (n 1) 28.
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forms of readmission agreements, they do not establish a situation in which interests are truly balanced. But 
they cause some shift of property rights from the stronger to the weaker party,110 and thereby some inter-
nalisation of the detrimental effects of the restriction of migration.
These agreements might therefore well be the beginning of a process of empowerment of countries of 
origin (or the symptom of their growing leverage).111 The downside of this is that it is rarely the (potential) 
migrants who are compensated for the opportunities they have to sacrifice but their countries of origin. 
Such compensations for external effects that are mainly felt by citizens rather than States are, therefore, eas-
ier to accept for governments that do not risk to pay a political price for such agreements (governments that 
are little responsive to the demands of their citizens). It is also highly questionable whether the compensa-
tion that countries of origin receive, finds its way to the citizens that bear the negative external effect. The 
internalisation of the external effect is riddled with a principal-agent problem (in which potential migrants 
are the principals and governments of their countries of origin the agents). Still, every form of compensation 
for the prevention of migration enhances its price and contributes to bring down the volume of migration 
restriction closer to an overall optimum.112
If this trend is to continue, the prevention of migration will get more expensive. Less and less migration 
can be prevented if its added value (for those who benefit) outweighs its costs (for those who lose).
VI. Conclusion
The property rights approach not only allows to describe a vast variety of treaties regarding migration in a 
common frame of analysis and to describe how these treaties redistribute the valuable control over indi-
vidual’s mobility. It also helps to highlight a trend towards internalisation of the external effects created 
by the initial allocation of property rights over migration. Interestingly, this trend seems also to be at work 
where the production of negative external effects is perfectly legal under international law – in the context 
of exclusion of would-be migrants without any entitlement of admission. The difficulty in enforcing the 
legal allocation of property rights (and to thereby creating negative external effects) leads to treaties by 
which States agree to pay some sort of price in exchange for cooperation in migration governance. This leads 
to an increasing internalisation. Non-standard readmission agreements are not the only examples where 
this is observable. Free movement of persons agreements by which interesting labour markets are gradually 
unlocked in exchange for access to markets in goods and services are another example.
In sum, a property rights approach to international treaties regarding migration tells quite a surprising 
story of the development of international migration governance: States – at one time the agents that deline-
ated property rights over migration and allocated practically all of them to themselves – have to transfer 
more and more of these valuable assets. Not just to contracting States and International Organisations, 
but even more so to individual migrants. The bundle of rights of (potential) migrants has become bolder 
over time and the prevention of migration by receiving States gradually becomes more costly. This is not in 
contradiction with the observation of newly emerging barriers against migration and ever more sophisti-
cated technology to manage migration. The pressure to internalise the cost of preventing migration works 
selectively.113 While highly qualified migrants from affluent countries can rely on the bold legal protection 
of their market access abroad, for the most precarious groups of migrants, this trend is slow to have a visible 
effect. But non-standard-agreements are examples to show that the restriction and reversal even of irregular 
migration increasingly comes at a price that has to be paid to countries of origin. If the trend is to continue 
that migration governance relies more and more on the cooperation of countries of origin (or transit), it is 
also likely that the trend towards internalisation of the costs of the prevention of migration is to continue. 
This will enhance the costs of the restriction of migration and will, therefore, bring the volume of restriction 
closer to an optimal level. Moreover, in the long run, the agents (countries of origin) will likely have to share 
part of the compensation with even the most marginalised of the principals (potential migrants). One way 
of doing so is to press for legal paths for their international mobility.
 110 Hollifield (n 51) 235.
 111 Cassarino (n 1) 17.
 112 The overall optimum here means the aggregated optimum for all those affected by the outcome of the initial allocation and/or 
the subsequent transactions. The criterion of overall optimum would become meaningless if it allowed excluding some of the 
concerned agents from the assessment of its effects. The overall optimum, therefore, has to take into account the interests not just 
of citizens of a given country but also of potential immigrants and other affected agents.
 113 Hein de Haas, Katharina Natter and Simona Vezzoli, ‘Growing Restrictiveness or Changing Selection? The Nature and Evolution of 
Migration Policies’ (2016) International Migration Review 1–44, 30.
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